Cuban undersea cable politics

Note: This was posted at the time the cable installation began on my general Internet blog, It is belatedly published here.

Larry

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Undersea cables between the U. S. and Cuba have long been intertwined with politics. 

In 1887, The New York Times reported on the inauguration of a cable in support of the Cuban insurgents fighting for independence from Spain -- a precursor to the Spanish-American war. Phone service between the U.S. and Cuba began in 1921 with AT&T's installation of an undersea cable and AT&T dominated international telephony to Cuba until the 1990s.

In 1994, WilTe1 applied for permission to construct a 210-kilometer, 2.5-gigabit fiber optic cable that would have had roughly 41 times the then-authorized capacity, but they never received approval for an Internet cable.

In 1966 Sprint established a wireless link from Florida to Cuba, providing Cuba with its first Internet connection with funds from the U. S. National Science Foundation International Connections Program. 

When President Obama relaxed relations with Cuba, Daniel Sepulveda, who led two U. S. government delegations to Cuba, said there were at least a half-dozen proposals — from U. S. and non-U. S. companies — to construct an undersea cable between the US and Cuba. The most promising proposal was for a 56-kilometer link between the existing ARCOS cable, which connects to southern Florida, and Cuba. The proposal was submitted in August 2018 and the FCC deemed it acceptable for expedited 45-day processing, but nothing happened until Trump established a committee to consider the security risks of the cable. This month the committee advised the FCC to deny the politically hot proposal. 

Within a week, ETECSA, Cuba's state-owned telecommunication monopoly, and the French telecommunication company Orange announced an agreement to construct a 2,470-kilometer cable connecting Cuba and the Caribbean Island of Martinique. At the announcement ceremony officials of ETECSA and Orange said technical work had already begun and the permits for the cable had been granted. This was clearly planned in advance and the announcement was triggered by the decision on the ARCOS cable. (I wonder if the topic came up when President Biden and Prime Minister Macron met recently).

As shown here, Cuba currently has undersea cable connections to Venezuela and Jamaica (red) and a U. S. owned cable (green) between Guantanamo and Florida. (There has been discussion of giving the Cable to Cuba someday). 

The new Arimao cable will run from Schoelcher, Martinique to Arimao Beach in the Cienfuegos Province on Cuba's south coast and will connect to Havana and other Cuban locations over the domestic backbone. They have already begun laying the cable, which will take around three weeks and it is expected to be ready for service in 2023. Its capacity is listed as "unknown."

The Arimao cable will improve service and resilience in Cuba, but approving the ARCOS cable would have been a better solution for the following reasons:

• It would have improved the standing of the U. S. in the region and the world. The UN General Assembly has voted on a resolution calling for the end of the U. S. embargo on Cuba every year since 1992 (except in 2020 due to COVID). This year 184 nations voted for the resolution, Colombia, Ukraine, and Brazil abstained and only the U. S. and Israel voted no.
• The 56-kilometer ARCOS cable would have been cheaper and a little faster than the 2,470-kilometer cable. (I do not know how the cable is being financed, but ETECSA and Orange are listed as owners).
• The cable would already be in service.
• The cable would have landed on the north side of the island at Cojimar, a district of Havana, the source and destination of heavy traffic, lightening the load on the Cuban backbone and improving latency.
• It may have improved U. S.-Cuba relations.

In my opinion, this was a lost opportunity.

Update 12/18/2022

Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez tweeted the following after the Cuba-Martinique undersea cable was announced:

Establishing a submarine cable connection between Florida and Cuba would be a positive step for both countries and would expand Internet access for Cubans. Denying it contradicts the position declared by the US government in May 2022. (original in Spanish)

Why did he post that at this time? Was it to make it clear that the U. S., not Cuba, had stopped the ALBA cable link? What impact would a third international link have?

Update 2/7/2923

ETECSA president Tania Velázquez Rodríguez said the current ALBA-1 cable is saturated and the new Arimao cable has a tentative go-live date of next April. Experts on Twitter doubt that the cable will be ready for service that soon. The expected capacity of the cable is unknown, but if the ALBA-1 cable is saturated, it should improve Cuban international access.

Time for a change in our Cuban Internet strategy

In a post last week, I advised Cuban President Díaz-Canel that investment in fixed broadband Internet would benefit both the Cuban people and his regime. This week, I've got advice for US President Biden -- don't try to out-pander the Republicans and call President Díaz-Canel's bluff by offering support for fixed broadband.

What won't work

Claiming that the recent protests were a "United States-backed, social media-driven plot to stir up public discontent and overthrow the Cuban regime," the Cuban government blocked Internet access on July 11th. That prompted FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr to endorse Florida's Governor Ron DeSantis' call for President Biden to "provide the necessary support for American enterprises to deliver Internet service to the Cuban people." Senator Rubio and other Republican politicians agree and Commissioner Carr assured us that "we have the technical capability to do this."

When asked about the technology in a subsequent interview, Commissioner Carr reasserted his confidence that we could do it, but said he didn't "want to get too bogged down in the particulars of that because my sense is there's going to be other technologies that I'm not aware of, including from DOD or CIA, that can also help facilitate this." I'll try to keep an open mind when read about those DOD and CIA technologies but, for now, I don't see how it can be done. 

A Cuban agent with a seized antenna
disguised as a boogie board

I've seen suggestions that it could be done using forthcoming low-Earth orbit satellite constellations like SpaceX Starlink, but there are problems with that. Earlier attempts to smuggle in end-user terminals by Alan Gross and others disguised as surfing equipment have failed spectacularly. (Gross spent five years in prison). Furthermore, they would have been inconsequential drops-in-the bucket had they succeeded. Finally, if we could get even one Starlink terminal into Cuba, would SpaceX would be willing to flaunt international law and connect to it without Cuban permission?

Another "solution" is to deploy balloon-based mobile phone towers in the stratosphere, creating an alternate cell phone company that could use Cuban mobile phones. Do they have the technology to do that? How about getting SIM cards for the "US BallonNet" mobile phone company into Cuban handsets? 

If they did get SIM cards to the people, what about radio interference with Cubacel's terrestrial towers? I'm not a lawyer, but transmitting without Cuban permission sounds like a violation of international law or at least custom, but that wouldn't bother Commissioner Carr because he "doesn't care." In a recent interview, he said "The pinheads at the ITU (UN International Telecommunication Union) will likely view this as a violation of international law. So we need to stand up the support of the federal government to do this." (Ex-FCC Chairman Pai also participated in the interview).

Others have suggested that we offer support for the Psiphon VPN service. I believe we are already doing that and on July 15 nearly 1.4 million Cubans used Psiphon. Psiphon support was a good idea.

How about hotspots near the US Embassy or using wireless backhaul from offshore? How many people would a hotspot reach and how long would it take the Cuban government to arrest them?

From Eisenhower's embargo to the Bay of Pigs invasion to Trump's trade, financial, and tourism restrictions and declaring Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism, the hard-line has failed to dislodge the Cuban regime.

What might work

President Obama spoke to the
Cuban people.

In spite of its apparent impossibility, the call to "beam the Internet to the Cuban people" puts President Biden in a political bind. He has responded by stating that he is "actively collaborating with the private sector to identify creative ways to ensure the Cuban people have safe and secure access to the free flow of information on the Internet." While it may not be possible to achieve that goal using technical subterfuge, there is another possibility -- he can go over the heads of the Cuban leaders and make well-publicized offers of assistance to the Cuban people. Let me outline two such offers.

Smuggling SpaceX Starlink terminals into Cuba is a dead end, but SpaceX offering service in Cuba would be possible if both SpaceX and the Cuban government would agree to do it. I suspect that iconoclastic Elon Musk would be willing -- it would be good business and good karma. 

Díaz-Canel and ETECSA executives would be a harder sell. Diplomacy and a well-publicized offer that was visible to the Cuban people would put pressure on the Cuban regime. If the campaign succeeded and Starlink became available in Cuba, it would benefit the people and therefore, in the long run, relax the grip of the Cuban regime. 

Cuban backbone network 

An undersea cable connecting the US and Cuba would also improve the Cuban Internet. Today the vast majority of Cuba's international Internet traffic is carried on the ALBA-1 undersea cable at the southeast end of the island, far from Havana and other population centers to the west. There have been at least half a dozen proposals to connect Cojimar, near Havana, to Florida. Doing so would provide backup in case of a temporary problem on the ALBA-1 cable, cut average latency time on international links, and, most important, reduce the load on Cuba's terrestrial backbone, saving terrestrial infrastructure investment.

The most recent of these proposals was for a branch from the ARCOS undersea cable to a landing point at Cojumar. The ARCOS consortium applied for permission on July 23, 2018, and the application was approved for "streamlined processing procedures" -- 45 days -- by the FCC. It had still not been acted upon when it was withdrawn without comment on October 20, 2020. 

President Biden could authorize the re-activation of the ARCOS application, and, if it is no longer on the table, a suitable alternative could be found. There was also talk at one time of eventually turning the undersea cable running from our base at Guantánamo to Florida. That could also be done, although a cable landing near Havana would be more valuable.

One last Internet-related item. While The President lacks the authority to fire FCC commissioner Carr, he should call for his resignation. A US official advocating violation of international law is embarrassing and Putin-worthy.

Before concluding, allow me a quick digression. Improving the Internet is a long-run project, but the pandemic requires immediate action. President Biden should immediately remove any supply chain and financing barriers impeding Cuba's ability to acquire, manufacture and distribute COVID 19 vaccine and related medical equipment.

The US has been trying to overthrow the Cuban government for over 60 years at great cost to us and the Cuban people. The hard-line strategy was initiated by President Eisenhower during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. His fear of the Soviet Union was based upon profound personal experience as the general who led the allied invasion of Europe and watched the Iron Curtain fall

When he ran for president, Eisenhower had two slogans -- "I like Ike" and "It's time for a change." Today, the Soviet Union has collapsed and our current global rival, China, is eating our lunch in Cuba. It's time for a change in our Cuba Internet strategy.

A simple suggestion for President Biden regarding the Cuban Internet

President Biden has a lot on his plate, but having someone pursue a Cuban undersea cable would be simple and benefit both Cuba and the US.

The Cuban backbone (source)

Last September I asked what had happened to the proposal for a branch connecting the ARCOS undersea cable, which has a landing point in North Miami Beach, to Cojimar, Cuba. The consortium that operates the cable had applied for permission to connect Cuba in July 2018 and the FCC granted a request for streamlined processing, which should have taken less than 45 days, but nothing happened until September 2020 when the application was referred to a Justice Department committee for the assessment of foreign participation in the telecommunication services sector, that Trump had established in an executive order on April 4, 2020.

On October 26, 2020 -- shortly before the election -- the application was withdrawn without explanation. I asked the FCC officials involved why the processing had taken so long and why the application was withdrawn, but received no answer. I also filed Freedom of Information Act Requests with the FCC and Justice Department, but my questions were not answered. (Justice did not even reply).

But that is history -- spilled milk. During the campaign, President Biden said he would "try to reverse the failed Trump policies that inflicted harm on Cubans and their families" and he has taken steps to liberalize travel and remittances. He has a lot on his plate beside Cuba, but having someone pursue a Cuban undersea cable would be simple and benefit both Cuba and the US.

The first step would be to contact the operators of the ARCOS cable to see if they are still interested in the Cuban branch. If not, other options should be pursued. Daniel Sepulveda, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy, in the Obama administration said there were at least a half-dozen proposals — from US and non-US companies — to construct a north-south undersea cable between the US and Cuba. There had also been discussion of one day allowing Cuban access to the US cable at Guantanamo, GTMO-1.

An undersea cable to the US would be a boost to the Cuban Internet. Nearly all Cuban international traffic is carried over the ALBA-1 cable, which lands at the south-east end of the island so traffic from heavily populated areas like Havana must traverse the national backbone. An undersea cable from Cojimar, which is near Havana, would reduce latency, free backbone capacity, save capital investment and provide a backup path in case of an outage.

Note that even Trump would agree with this proposal. His policy was to "amplify efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services" and he directed government departments and agencies "to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba." He also established a task force "to examine technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba" and did nothing to reverse any of President Obama's Cuba telecommunication policies.

President Biden might be concerned that such a move might be politically damaging since Cuban-American voters in Florida favored Trump in the last election, but that is not a sure thing. The 2020 Florida International University Cuba Poll showed that among south Florida Cubans, young people are most liberal on issues like the embargo and all except those over 75 consider Cuba policy less important than the economy, health care, race, immigration, and China policy. Demographics and Trump's impeachments may have shifted Cuban voting patterns by 2022 or 2024.

Supporting an undersea cable between the US and Cuba would also enhance our reputaion in the region and encroach upon China's near monopoly as a vendor of Cuban Internet infrastructure. It would also strengthen the US's strategic position vis-a-vis China's expansion in the region.

President Obama sought rapproachmont with Cuba and several Internet-related proposals followed, but the result was disappointing. Trump and Raúl Castro are now ex-presidents so the ARCOS cable may stand a chance. (It would not be unprecedented -- Cuba's first connection to the Internet was through the US National Science Foundation International Connections Program for research and university networks in developing nations).

Update 4/5/2021

In March 2019, Google and ETECSA signed a memorandum of understanding committing to cost-free interchange of traffic between their networks once Cuba was able to connect to a new undersea cable that would be laid, presumably to Miami "sometime in the future." That cable has not yet been laid and I got no answer when I asked Google what the project status was last week.

Google has persisted in an effort to improve Cuban Internet connectivity and access for years but the effort has yielded very little. They have installed Google Global Cache servers in Cuba, enabling ETECSA to serve some Google content from within its own network, and established one public WiFi hotspot.

There were hopes for progress when President Obama visited Cuba, but the Cuban government under Raúl Castro was unwilling and Díaz-Canel was met by Trump. President Biden has a lot on his mind these days, but I hope Google is hanging in.

What became of the ARCOS undersea cable connection to Cuba?

Will Trump kill the proposal before the election?

Proposed 56km link between the
ARCOS undersea Cable and Cuba

Cuba's primary connection to the global Internet is through the ALBA-1 undersea cable linking landing points on the south-east shore of the island to Venezuela and Jamaica; however, the bulk of Cuban traffic originates in Havana which is on the north-west coast. Traffic from Havana and other cities in the west travels over a backbone to reach the cable landing points. A landing point near Havana would reduce the load on the backbone, speeding connections, providing redundancy, and saving capital investment.

At one time, there seemed to be bipartisan support in the US for improving Cuban Internet access. During his second term, President Obama pursued detente with Cuba and much of that effort was focused on the role of the Internet and undersea cable connectivity was part of the plan. Daniel Sepulveda, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy, who led two US government delegations to Cuba during the Obama administration, said there were at least a half-dozen proposals — from US and non-US companies — to construct a north-south undersea cable between the US and Cuba. There had even been discussion of one day allowing Cuban access to the US cable at Guantanamo, GTMO-1.

At first, Trump seemed to agree -- consider the following timeline:

• October 20, 2017, The State Department issued National Security Presidential Memorandum, NSPM-5, stating that it was our policy to "Amplify efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services" and directing government departments and agencies "to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba."
• January 22, 2018, The State Department established a Cuba Internet Task Force "to examine technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba." (Disclosure -- The Task Force formed two sub-committees and I was a member of both).
• July 23, 2018, The consortium that owns the ARCOS cable applied to construct a branch from the cable to an ETECSA supplied cable landing spot in Cojimar, Cuba.
• August 10, 2018, The FCC found the application "to be acceptable for filing and subject to the streamlined processing procedures" obligating them to take action "within forty-five (45) days" unless upon "further examination" the application is "deemed ineligible for streamlined processing."

Well, it seems the application must have been deemed ineligible since as far as I know nothing happened until earlier this month when The Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (CAFPUSTSS), which Trump established in an executive order on April 4, 2020, notified the FCC that it is planning to conduct 120-day security reviews of the ARCOS application.

I reached out to the FCC and the attorney who filed the request for the cable branch to ask why the application had not been acted upon but got no reply. I can think of two possible explanations:

• Trump changed his policy with respect to Cuban Internet connectivity without, as far as I know, telling anyone.
• Trump held this application up in order to grab a Florida headline between now and the election when the CAFPUSTSS rejects the application showing how tough he is on Cuba in an effort to win Cuban and Venezuelan votes.

I'm unfamiliar with FCC procedures and workflow -- is there another explanation?

Finally, note that on March 15, 2018, Deep Blue Cable Inc. applied for a Caribbean cable with 19 landing points. While none of those were in Cuba, they planned a second phase with two Cuban landing points, but the Deep Blue application was withdrawn on November 11, 2019.

Update 11/30/2020

Denise Coca, FCC Division Chief, informed me that the ARCOS-1 application had been withdrawn on October 20, 2020, about two weeks before the election. When asked why the FCC had taken so long to process the application, she did not answer.

I wonder whether this might be re-submitted to the Biden FCC. Since the administration sought Cuban rapprochement during his time as Vice President, I imagine Biden would favor the link. One can argue that doing so would be a net political win among Florida voters. Would Cuban president Díaz-Canel approve it? It would reduce traffic on the Cuban backbone and improve international connectivity, but might be construed as a security threat and neutralize one of his complaints against the US.

Does China's Digital Silk Road to Latin America and the Caribbean run through Cuba?

China will not ignore Latin America and the Caribbean forever and Cuba is a logical place to start.

DSR IT infrastructure projects as of 12/2018 (source).

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious, long-term, global investment and development program. It was launched in 2013 with a focus on infrastructure -- roads, railroads, pipelines, undersea cables and ports. Since then China has invested $80 billion and signed 173 BRI agreements with 125 countries and 29 international organizations.

Building a Digital Silk Road (DSR) is a BRI subgoal. The DSR was added in 2015 under the name "Information Silk Road" with the goals of improving international communications connectivity and fostering the internationalization of China’s rapidly growing tech companies. The DSR plan addresses technologies like security, machine learning, 5G wireless, chip design and manufacturing and applications in areas like e-commerce, e-government, and smart cities. It also encompasses infrastructure in space -- the BeiDou satellite navigation system, the Hongyun low-earth orbit broadband Internet project and the Digital Belt and Road Earth observation program.

Huawei's Caribbean cables (source).

China Unicom and Camcom installed an undersea cable between Cameroon and Brazil with Huawei doing the engineering and installation. Previously, Huawei had installed the underwater cables shown here, but the DSR project has focused primarily on Eurasia and Africa. However, China will not ignore Latin America and the Caribbean forever and Cuba is a logical place to start.

Cuban delegates attended the thematic-forum on the DSR at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April and Cuba's digital ties to China date back many years:

• Huawei contracted to build a fiber optic backbone in 2000 and their office is in the same complex as ETECSA's.
• Shanghai Bell was a partner in the joint venture that installed Cuba's undersea cable.
• China may have provided a loan to finance Cuba's undersea cable.
• Cuba had difficulty paying their Chinese debt and China forgave six billion dollars in 2011.
• China offers Cuba favorable financing on consumer and infrastructure telecommunication equipment.
• China and Cuba recently signed economic cooperation agreements.
• Chinese laptops and tablets are assembled in Cuba.
• Cuban professors receive Chinese laptops.
• ETECSA sells and services Huawei phones.
• Huawei equipment is used in Cuba's backbone, home DSL and public WiFi networks.

(Breitbart reported that Cuba has agreed to bring the BRI to the west, but I am not sure if that is evidence that they will or they won't :-)

Cuba's first connection to the Internet was subsidized by the US National Science Foundation and used Cisco equipment, but it's been downhill ever since. President Obama made a sustained effort to establish a connection with Cuba, but little has come of that and Trump's policies on trade, immigration and Cuba have moved us further from many Latin American and Caribbean nations, creating an opening for China and the DSR.

Update 2/3/2020

Huawei built an undersea cable connecting four landing points in southern Chile and Chile is studying the feasibility of a trans-pacific undersea cable connecting Valparaiso with China or Japan. Chilean President Sebastian Pinera met with Huawei executives on a visit to China in April and invited them to bid on the project.

Will Cisco make a comeback in Cuba?

Is the recently announced Cisco Networking Academy at the Universidad de Ciencias Informáticas a belated drop in the bucket or the first step in a significant opening?

Laura Quintana, Cisco Vice President of Corporate Affairs, launching
Cisco networking training at the Universidad de Ciencias Informáticas

Cisco dominated the infrastructure equipment market in Cuba and elsewhere during the early days of the Internet, but Huawei replaced them in Cuba -- here is a timeline:

• President Eisenhower severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and blocked nearly all trade with the US in 1960 (timeline).
• President Kennedy's administration imposed a complete economic embargo in 1962.
• In spite of that, the US National Science Foundation provided Cuba's first link to the global internet in 1996 using Cisco equipment that was probably acquired through other nations.
• The 1996 Helms-Burton Act added penalties for foreign nations doing business with Cuba and said the embargo could not be lifted while the Castros were in power.
• In 1997, Cisco began offering Cisco Networking Academy (CNA) training.
• In 2000, Huawei entered the Cuban market and won a contract to build a fiber backbone.
• In 2000 Huawei began replacing Cisco routers.
• In 2015, Doug Madory discovered what may be the last Cisco router in Cuba.
• In 2016, President Obama announced that Cisco would be offering their Cisco Networking Academy (CNA) training at the Universidad de Ciencias Informáticas (UCI).
• The CNA program was inaugurated last week and is expected to train over 100 engineers per year.

What does this mean?

It might be a belated drop in the bucket. UCI has only 19 trained CNA instructors while the CNA curriculum is being taught by over 20,000 instructors at over 10,000 institutions.

On the other hand, this might be the first step in a significant opening. The Castros are no longer in power -- might the US allow Cisco to sell equipment to Cuba and might the Cubans consider Cisco as a competitor to Huawei, SES, and other connectivity providers?

The Trump administration has cracked down on individual travel but has not curtailed the sales of communication equipment to Cuba. Trump would doubtless like to claim credit for any Cuban sales by Cisco and for Raúl Castro stepping down and he is indifferent to human rights violation, so my guess is that the US would allow Cisco to sell to Cuba.

Similarly, competition from Cisco would enhance Cuba's bargaining position with Huawei and, while much of their SNA material is generic, some is Cisco-specific, giving them an advantage. I don't know if Cisco is charging for their training or equipment, but they may be donating it as a marketing and international public-relations expense. (In the mainframe days, IBM gave significant discounts and subsidies to universities so students would be trained on their equipment. They even built the building to house the computers at the UCLA Western Data Processing Center where I was a student).

It's too soon to know if this is an important first step and it will be interesting to see how events unfold. A good start would be for the US to allow Cubans access to Cisco's online CNA courses and for UCI to expand their initial internal offering and to train CNA instructors at schools and organizations like the Unión de Informáticos, ETECSA, networks like Infomed, and the Joven Clubs.

President Obama announced the Cisco-UCI SNA plan over two years ago. Two years from now, we will know whether it is significant for either Cisco or Cuba.

The Internet in Cuba -- a Periodismo de Barrio anthology

Periodismo de Barrio has edited a collection of 13 articles on the Cuban Internet in collaboration with the Internet Policy Observatory at the University of Pennsylvania. The articles cover the history of the Cuban Internet, the legal framework, services, communities, and projects. It is a diverse collection -- something for everyone. Here are thumbnail summaries of each article:

¿Puede Estados Unidos conectar a Internet a los cubanos? – Elaine Díaz Rodríguez
A critical look at US efforts to enhance Cuban connectivity, from the Clinton administration through the recent formation of the Cuban Internet Task Force by Trump
La ruta de Internet en Cuba – Anidelys Rodríguez Brito
A survey of Cuban networking from the pre-Internet days through today's 3G, home DSL, and public access points
Internet en Cuba: ¿limitada por la política o la economía? – Eloy Viera Cañive
A survey of the political and economic factors that curb Cuban access and content
¿Quién eres, ETECSA? – Mabel Olalde Azpiri
A history of ETECSA and its role in serving Infomed and other networks as well as the general public
Variaciones sobre la wifi – Lianet Fleites
A portrait of WiFi hotspot users and uses
Te quiero, mi sangre – Geisy Guia Delis
People connecting with expatriate family members
Nauta Hogar: nueva herramienta para emprendedores cubanos – Julio Batista Rodríguez
Nauta Hogar: a new tool for Cuban entrepreneurs
El color verde en la palabra Sígueme – Jesús Jank Curbelo
A look at Sígueme, the SNET "Facebook" application
Se venden héroes a diez pesos – Carlos Melián
Kids playing multiplayer online games
Tecnología y cambio social en Cuba: en busca de hipervínculos – Mónica Baró Sánchez
An interview of Yohana Lezcano Lavandera, who advocates computer literacy education
El Callejón de los Milagros – Rogelio Serrano
An interview with professor and researcher Juan Antonio García Borrero about his project The Alley of the Mircales
Ocho aplicaciones contra la desconexión – Mónica Baró Sánchez
Descriptions of eight mobile phone apps that can be used offline
¿Qué podría hacer el gobierno cubano en el escenario virtual? – Jessica Domínguez Delgado
Potential e-government applicatioins in Cuba

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of this collection is not any one of the articles, but the fact that they were pulled together and edited as an innovative online "dossier" -- an anthology of articles on the Internet in Cuba.

Finally, the editor, Elaine Díaz Rodríguez. asked me for feedback on her opening contribution ¿Puede Estados Unidos conectar a Internet a los cubanos? and I might as well share my comments.

Elaine covered several US efforts to influence the Cuban Internet, most recently Trump's Cuban Internet Task Force. I've written a couple of posts on the Task Force, which I see as a political act. That being said, the Task Force participant's hearts are in the right place for the most part and we can hope that genuine aid and investment might be possible in the future if Trump is defeated and Diaz-Canel adopts Internet-friendly policies.

Elaine also drilled down on the Alan Gross fiasco. I've written many posts about Alan Gross, including several on what he actually did, how little difference he would have made had he succeeded and how much the Cubans overstated the impact it would have had.

I agree with Elaine that nothing happened as a result of President Obama's trip to Cuba. That being said, Google has worked diligently, before and after President Obama's trip, to establish relationships in Cuba. The only concrete result has been their caching server (GCC) in Cuba, but the relationships they have built may pay off in the long run. (GCC has resulted in a noticeable increase in YouTube traffic relative to Facebook).

I've also written posts on La ruta de Internet en Cuba -- including one on the initial Cuban Internet connection over a link provided by Sprint with a subsidy from the US National Science Foundation and several on pre-Internet networking in Cuba.

I've speculated on the question raised in the essay Internet en Cuba: ¿limitada por la política o la economía?. From the early days of the Internet, it has been both the economy and politics, but I would add vested interests and bureaucracy today.

Another post asks ¿Quién eres, Etecsa?, a question I've also asked, but can't answer.

The post Te quiero, mi sangre shows WiFi hotspots being used to communicate emotion and presence, in the tradition of the pioneering Hole in Space performance art project.

I've also looked at Nauta Hogar, and, while I agree that it is useful for some tech and other small businesses, it is a dead end on the road to home connectivity.

The articles include photos and other images as well as original illustrations.

=====
Update 5/31/2018

Periodismo de Barrio is also experimenting with short video documentaries about the Cuban Internet. Here are links to their first five videos:

• Episodio 1: Amor en la wifi
  
• Episodio 2: Redes underground
  
• Episodio 3: Airbnb en casa
  
• Episodio 4: De canales y youtubers
  
• Episodio 5: El distribuidor musical
  

SpaceX Starlink and Cuba -- a match made in low-Earth orbit?

I've suggested that Cuba could use geostationary-orbit (GSO) satellite Internet service as a stopgap measure until they could afford to leapfrog over today's technology to next-generation infrastructure. They did not pick up on that stopgap suggestion, but how about low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite Internet service as a next-generation solution?

SpaceX, OneWeb, Boeing and others are working on LEO satellite Internet projects. There is no guarantee that any of them will succeed -- these projects require new technology and face logistical, financial and regulatory obstacles -- but, if successful, they could provide Cuba with affordable, ubiquitous, next-generation Internet service.

Cuba should follow and consider each potential system, but let's focus on SpaceX since their plan is ambitious and they might have the best marketing/political fit with Cuba.

LEO satellite service will hopefully reach a milestone this week when SpaceX launches two test satellites. If the tests go well, SpaceX plans to begin launching operational satellites in 2019 and begin offering commercial service in the 2020-21 time frame. They will complete their first constellation of 4,425 satellites by 2024. (To put that in context, there are fewer than 2,000 operational satellites in orbit today).

SpaceX has named their future service "Starlink," and, if Starlink succeeds, they could offer Cuba service as early as 2020 and no later than 2024 depending upon which areas they plan to service first.

What has stopped the Cuban Internet and why might LEO satellites look good to Cuba?

Cuba blames their lack of connectivity on the US embargo, but President Obama cleared the way for the export of telecommunication equipment and services to Cuba and Trump has not reversed that decision.

I suspect that fear of losing political control -- the inability to filter and surveil traffic -- stopped Cuba from allowing GSO satellite service. Raúl Castro and others feared loss of control of information when Cuba first connected to the Internet in 1996, but Castro is about to step down and perhaps the next government will be more aware of the benefits of Internet connectivity and more confident in their ability to use it to their advantage.

A lack of funds has also constrained the Cuban Internet -- they cannot afford a large terrestrial infrastructure buildout and are reluctant (for good and bad reasons) to accept foreign investment. SpaceX is building global infrastructure so the marginal cost of serving Cuba would be near zero.

They say that the capital equipment for providing high-speed, low-latency service to a Cuban home, school, clinic, etc. would be a low-cost, user-installed ground-station. I've not seen ground-station price estimates from SpaceX, but their rival OneWeb says their $250 ground-station will handle a 50 Mbps, 30 ms latency Internet link and serve as a hot-spot for WiFi, LTE, 3G or 2G connectivity.

Since the marginal cost of serving a nation would be small and they hope to provide affordable global connectivity, I expect their service price will vary among nations. Prices would be relatively high in wealthy and low in poor nations -- there would be no point in having idle satellites flying over Cuba or any other place.

Expansion of the Cuban Internet is also constrained by bureaucracy and vested financial interest in ETECSA and established vendors. While I do not endorse Cuba's current monopoly service and infrastructure ownership policy, it could remain unchanged if ETECSA were to become a reseller of SpaceX Internet connectivity.

In summary, if Starlink succeeds, they could offer affordable, ubiquitous high-speed Internet, saving Cuba the cost of investing in expensive terrestrial infrastructure and allowing ETECSA to maintain its monopoly. The only intangible roadblock would be a loss of control of traffic. (But Cuban propagandists and trolls would be able to reach a wider audience :-).

That is the rosy picture from the Cuban point of view, what about SpaceX?

OneWeb plans to offer LEO satellite Internet service in Alaska in 2019 and hopes to cover all of Alaska by the end of 2020.

How about SpaceX starting by serving Cuba?

I don't know the SpaceX constellation rollout plan, but satellites that serve Cuba would also be capable of serving the eastern US and FCC licenses are conditional upon providing US service in a timely manner.

Since Cuba is an island nation, portions of the footprint of satellites serving Cuba would fall on the uninhabited ocean. That would reduce population destiny in the satellite footprint area, freeing capacity for use by customers in relatively urban areas.

Selecting Cuba as its initial service market would be an audacious move, but Elon Musk is not a conventional, conservative businessman. SpaceX would get a lot of publicity from a Cuba opening and, like the roadster they just launched into orbit, first offering Starlink service in Cuba would have symbolic value -- marking an opening to Cuba.

There is pent-up demand for Internet access in Cuba since they have very poor Internet access given their level of education and development.

Cuba is 166th among the 176 nations the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) ranks on access to telecommunications. Haiti, ranked 167th, is the only nation in Latin America and the Caribbean (LA&C) that ranks below Cuba, yet Cuba ranks 9th in the region on the ITU telecommunication-skills index. Cuba ranks tenth in LA&C on the United Nations Development Programme's human-development index and their mean years of schooling is the highest in the region.

Cuba's relatively high human-development and IT-skill indices reflect its emphasis on free public education at all levels. This is exemplified by the curriculum at Cuba's Information Science University, where students pay no tuition but are required to work on useful applications in education, health, sport, and online government.

But, perhaps the biggest contributor to pent-up demand is El Paquete Semanal, a weekly distribution of current, pirated Internet content that is distributed throughout the nation. I've heard the claim that 95% of Cubans see El Paquete content each week. That sounds high, but it is very popular and has been alleged to be Cuba's largest private employer.

The political situation is the elephant in the room. The US has formed a Cuba Internet Task Force and Trump is following President Obama's lead in seeking to strengthen the Cuban Internet, so it unlikely that the US government would object to SpaceX offering Starlink service to Cubans.

That being said, such a move would be unpopular among some members of Trump's Cuban "base." While there might be some domestic political cost to SpaceX, an opening to Cuba would be seen as extremely positive in Latin America and the rest of the world and SpaceX and Tesla are global companies. (Only Israel supports the US embargo of Cuba).

If you guys want to talk about this, DM @RaulCastroR and @elonmusk.

Update 2/27/2018

Two years ago, Google invested $900 million in SpaceX, stating that they expected the acquisition would be used “to keep Google Maps accurate with up-to-date imagery and, over time, improve Internet access and disaster relief.”

In the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, Google began providing mobile phone and Internet connectivity in Puerto Rico using their Project Loon balloons and today they are serving 200,000 Puerto Rican users. They have learned from this effort and demonstrated the ability to provide Project Loon connectivity. How about using Starlink when it is available?

Starlink envisions low-cost, user-installed terminals at homes and other end-user sites, but their satellites will also have to connect to ground-stations and it turns out that Google has a lot of terrestrial points of presence on the Internet. Some of them are shown on the following map:

Google Global Cache locations(source)

Note that one of those points of presence is in Havana and two others are in Puerto Rico.

SpaceX rocketry, Starlink satellites and service plus Google's terrestrial infrastructure sounds like a formidable combination -- perhaps too formidable. A part of me would love to see such a combination succeed and eventually provide a truly global Internet, but I am also afraid of the market and political power that enterprise would have. Would this or any other global Internet service provider require unique regulation and, if so, what should it be and who has the power to do it?

If a global ISP monopoly (or even an oligopoly) doesn't worry you, what about adding strong AI -- is the Earth beginning to grow a nervous system -- with us as biological components (for the time being)?

Update 3/20/2019

SpaceX sister company, SpaceX Services, filed an FCC application for "a blanket license authorizing operation of up to 1,000,000 earth stations that end-user customers will utilize to communicate with SpaceX’s LEO constellation." Those end-users will be individuals, libraries, schools, etc. "throughout the contiguous United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands." SpaceX will begin launching operational satellites this year, and those that provide connectivity over the US east coast and Puerto Rico will have idle capacity when in sight of Cuba. Cuba isn't politically ready to allow home connectivity, but how about satellite links to Youth Clubs, schools, clinics, libraries, etc.? It would be legal from the US side and the sort of thing Elon Musk might like to do.

Update 12/30/2019

Elon Musk confirms that Starlink Broadband should be available in the Caribbean in 2020 or early 2021. See more here. How about a ground station at Google's data center?

Suggestions for the Cuba Internet Task Force

John S. Creamer

The Cuba Internet Task Force (CITF) held their inaugural meeting last week.

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs John S. Creamer will chair the CITF and there are government representatives from the Department of State, Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Federal Communications Commission, National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Agency for International Development. Freedom House will represent NGOs and the Information Technology Industry Council will represent the IT industry.

They agreed to form two subcommittees -- one to explore the role of media and freedom of information in Cuba and one to explore Internet access. The subcommittees are to provide preliminary reports of recommendations within six months and the CITF will reconvene in October to review those preliminary reports and prepare a final report with recommendations for the Secretary of State and the President.

They are soliciting public comments, looking for volunteers for service on the subcommittees and have established a Web site.

I may be wrong, but it sounds like the subcommittees will be doing much of the actual work. The subcommittee on technological challenges to Internet access will include US technology firms and industry representatives and the subcommittee on media and freedom of information will include NGOs and program implementers with a focus on activities that encourage freedom of expression in Cuba through independent media and Internet freedom. They aim to maintain balance by including members from industry, academia and legal, labor, or other professionals.

I hope the Task Force resists proposals for clandestine programs. Those that have failed in the past have provided the Cuban government with an excuse for repression and cost the United States money and prestige. Both the Cuban and United States governments have overstated what their impact would have been had they succeeded.

Cuba's current Wi-Fi hotspots, navigation rooms, home DSL and 3G mobile are stopgap efforts based on obsolete technology and they provide inferior Internet access to a limited number of people. (El Paquete Semanal is the most important substitute for a modern Internet in Cuba today).

It would be difficult to devise plans or offer support for activities that the current Cuban government would allow and be able to afford; however, the situation may ease somewhat after Raúl Castro steps down in April. Are there short-run steps Cuba would be willing to take that we could assist them with?

For example, the next Cuban government might be willing to consider legitimizing and assisting some citizen-implemented stopgap measures like building street nets and rural community networks, selling geostationary satellite service and installing LANs in schools and other organizations.

They might also be willing to accept educational material and services like access to online material from Coursera or LAN-based courseware from MIT or The Khan Academy. (At the time of President Obama's visit, Cisco and the Universidad de las Ciencias Informaticas promised to cooperate in bringing the Cisco Network Academy to Cuba, but, as far as I know, that has not happened).

The US requires Coursera and other companies to block Cuban access to their services. We could reverse that policy unilaterally, without the permission of the Cuban government.

Google is the only US Internet company that has established a relationship with and been allowed to install infrastructure in Cuba. The next Cuban administration might be willing to trust them as partners in infrastructure projects like providing wholesale fiber service or establishing a YouTube production space in Havana. Cuba could also serve as a test population for Google services optimized for low-bandwidth networks.

These are short-term, stopgap measures. In the long run, Cuba should investigate opportunities for leapfrogging – planning for technology like 5G wireless and low-Earth orbit satellites that will be available in, say, five years. Our mobile phone companies and nascent satellite ISPs SpaceX and OneWeb may have significant offerings in five years -- might Cuba be willing to work with them?

Long-run steps like these would require Cuba's leapfrogging regulatory and infrastructure-ownership policy. The ITU defines four generations of regulation and Cuba is one of the few remaining first-generation nations -- might the Cuban government be willing to make policy changes in five years?

The Cuba Internet Task Force -- a win for Trump, Castro, Putin and Xi

President Obama began working on Cuban rapprochement during his 2009 presidential campaign. After over five years of thought and negotiation, the Whitehouse announced a major shift in Cuba policy, which included allowing telecommunications providers "to establish the necessary mechanisms, including infrastructure, in Cuba to provide commercial telecommunications and Internet services, which will improve telecommunications between the United States and Cuba."

When President Obama's trip to Cuba was announced, I speculated on possible Internet-related advances but was disappointed by the results. While in Cuba, the President held optimistic public meetings and several Internet-related projects were announced, but, as far as I know, none of them materialized. Can we expect more from Trump?

Last summer, Trump said he would be changing our Cuba policy and I speculated on how it might affect the Internet, but could not think of anything reasonable. When he published his Cuba policy memorandum, one of its purposes was to restore Cuban's "right to speak freely, including through access to the Internet" and one of its goals was to "amplify efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services."

Trump said he was "canceling the last administration’s completely one-sided deal with Cuba," but his Internet policy sounded a lot like Obama's. The only concrete difference I saw was that Trump had ordered the State Department to convene a task force "to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba."

Last week, the State Department issued a public invitation to attend the first meeting of that Cuba Internet Task Force on February 7th.

I called the State Department to ask whether the meeting would be streamed or archived and was told that it would not. I asked if they had any information on the meeting agenda, the charge of the task force and who the members were. They referred my questions to the Press office, but they did not answer.

We will hopefully learn more after the meeting, but what might Trump do? Will we see the laissez-faire Trump who promised Saudi Arabia that "America will not seek to impose our way of life on others" or some sort of digital Bay of Pigs like the failed smuggling of satellite equipment into Cuba, Zunzuneo or the Alan Gross affair?

My guess is that not much will happen -- that this task force and the rest of Trump's Cuba policy is for domestic political consumption by anti-Castro politicians and voters. The Cuban government is also using the task force for domestic political consumption. Their reaction to its formation was predictable -- saying that Cuba is being attacked by a powerful, hostile nation. Within a few days of the formation of the task force, many articles like this one were published by the Cuban government and allied publications like China's Xinhua and Russia's RT. (Perhaps rekindling the Cold War is part of making America great again).

Ironically, this task force is a political win for both Castro and Trump -- autocracy thrives on fear and mistrust.

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Update 2/2/2018

Last night I saw The Final Year, a documentary on the final year of the Obama administration. In it, former Whitehouse staff member Ben Rhodes says it took them time to realize that Putin was not motivated by the interests of Russia, but by self-interest. That may be true to some extent for nearly all politicians, but it seems to fit Castro and Trump well in this case.

(As an aside -- Rhodes was one of the two White House staff members handling the negotiations leading up to our opening with Cuba).

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Update 2/3/2018

Following up on Ben Rhodes' comment on Putin -- establishing this task force or any other act that drives a wedge between Cuba and the US benefits Putin as well as Trump and Castro.

While Castro and Trump use the rift between their nations for domestic political advantage, Putin uses it for international political advantage and commerce.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union caused an economic crisis in Cuba, sharply cutting trade and cooperation with Russia and other Soviet republics, but in the last few years, trade and cooperation have picked up. In 2014, Russia forgave 90 percent of the $35 billion debt Cuba incurred during the economically difficult "special period" of the 1990s, with the remaining $3.5 billion to be settled by giving preferential treatment to Russian investments on the island.

Cuba and Russia are also cooperating on oil exploration, extraction and refining and Cuba is importing oil, cars, trucks, and railway infrastructure and equipment. Trade between Russia and Cuba rose 73 percent in the first half of 2017 to $176 million. There has even been talk of Russia reopening it's cold war Signals Intelligence base, which once had a staff of 1,500 in Cuba.

While Russia is building commercial and political ties with Cuba, China remains their largest trading partner and a major supplier of Internet and computer equipment. (For more on Cuba-China trades, click here). Even Iran is allying with Cuba.

Russia is also on the "right side" of public opinion of the Cuban embargo. The embargo is unpopular in Latin America and the rest of the world. (The US and Israel support the embargo in the UN and the remaining 191 UN member states oppose it).

Evidently making America great again entails having a hostile ally of Russia and China 90 miles from Florida -- sound familiar? Putin and Ji may be the biggest winners from our Cuban policy shift and the Cuban and American people the biggest losers.

Castro and Putin meeting at the UN (source)

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Update 2/7/2018

Reuters reports that Cuban independent media outlets oppose Trump's Cuba Internet policy.

Elaine Diaz, founder of Periodismo de Barrio, José Jasán Nieves, director of El Toque and Miguel Alejandro Hayes who writes for La Joven Cuba are all quoted as opposing the Trump initiative.

Nieves said civil society initiatives had "flourished" after the Obama-Castro detente and Diaz said she would refuse any money the Trump program might award and stressed that they are independent media "independent of Cuban authorities as well as any other government." Hayes does not agree with Trump's goal of toppling the Cuban government.

Of course, these are only three of many independent journalists in Cuba and they are not extremists.

I suspect that this Task Force will be given a budget and, if independent journalists are not interested in assistance from the US, they may end up funding secret projects like those mentioned above. That will allow Trump to claim to be tougher than Obama and the Cubans will discover the projects and overstate their significance -- propaganda wins for Trump and Castro while Putin and Ji smile quietly.

Google global cache servers are online in Cuba, but Google's App Engine is blocked

This is a belated update. I had hoped to get more information before posting it, but difficult Internet access in Cuba and now the hurricane got in the way -- better late than never.

Cuban requests for Google services are being routed to GCC servers in Cuba and all Google services that are available in Cuba are being cached -- not just YouTube. That will cut latency significantly, but Cuban data rates remain painfully slow. My guess is that Cubans will notice the improved performance in interactive applications, but maybe not perceive much of a change when watching a streaming video.

Note the italics in the above paragraph -- evidently, Google blocks access to their App Engine hosting and application development platform. Cuban developers cannot build App Engine applications and Cubans cannot access applications like the Khan Academy or Google's G-Suite.

The last time I checked, Rackspace and Amazon allowed access to their hosting platforms from Cuba, but IBM Softlayer and Google did not. President Obama clearly favored improved telecommunication for Cuba, stating that

I’ve authorized increased telecommunications connections between the United States and Cuba. Businesses will be able to sell goods that enable Cubans to communicate with the United States and other countries.

in his Cuba Policy Changes. While Trump claimed that he was "canceling the last administration’s completely one-sided deal with Cuba," he made few changes and has said nothing about restrictions on access to Internet services by Cubans.

I wonder why IBM and Google do not follow the lead of Amazon and Rackspace.