Five million mobile accounts

Active mobile accounts

Cubans now have 5 million mobile accounts. The five-millionth account was recently opened Guanabacoa, in the eastern part of Havana and we see here that growth slowed last year, but has resumed -- perhaps due to increased 3G availability.

Most Cubans have 2G phones, which are used primarily for making calls and sending text messages that may have attached images. As of June 2017 there were 856 2G base stations, covering 75% of Cuban territory and 85% of the population.

Cuba is rolling out 3G connectivity and ETECSA reports that 47% of the population is now covered and, as of last June, there was some coverage in all provincial capitals and tourist resorts.

The only speed data I have seen was gathered by Armando Camacho who ran a number of 3G speed tests in Havana (near the corner of Patrocinio and 10 de Octubre) and observed ping time to a server in Miami as ranging from 91 to 127 milliseconds, upload speed from .48 to 1.58 Mbps and download speed from .85 to 10.42 Mbps. The latter is fast enough to allow Web browsing and other applications, particularly those like YouTube Go, that are designed for use over slow, expensive connections in conjunction with offline SD-card storage.

Armando observed considerable speed variance, suggesting that others were sharing the same radio or backhaul resources and performance would be frustrating at times. (Have others run similar tests)?

I don't have any statistics, but many Cuban phones are incompatible with ETECSA's 3G service, so users will be stuck with 2G until they get new 3G phones.

Upgrading to 3G technology when 4G is common in many nations and 5G is close on the horizon may sound discouraging, but it makes sense as a stopgap strategy for Cuba since it keeps backhaul load down and phones are cheap. That being said, I hope they are evaluating the possibility of leapfrogging to 5G technology when it matures and they can afford it.

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Update 4/21/2018

For the 26-year history of mobile phones in Cuba see this post.

A 5G, community network strategy for Cuba (and other developing nations)

In a previous post, I suggested that Cuba might be able to leap over 4G to 5G wireless infrastructure using satellite and terrestrial networks for backhaul. While that would require political and policy change, it would be a good fit with Cuban culture and skills.

Before talking about Cuba, let me say a bit about wireless generations.

Each mobile technology generation used new technology and enabled new applications:

• 1G: Voice calls
• 2G: Digital data for text and sending small images
• 3G: Smartphones for low-quality video, Web browsing, and GPS
• 4G: High speed, lower latency communication for video streaming and chat and interaction with complex Web content

Fifth-generation wireless will be faster than today's 4G and latency is expected be on the order of 1 ms within the 5G network. Radios will be capable of beamforming -- rapidly switching focused beams among large numbers of devices -- and simultaneous two-way (full duplex) transmission at a given frequency. This will enable real-time applications like control of autonomous vehicles, remote medical procedures and augmented and virtual reality as well as fast file transfer and streaming and other, un-imagined applications.

Do not think of this as the evolution of the cell-phone network; think of it as a discontinuity in wireless communication to mobile and fixed users.

In addition to enabling new applications, each mobile computing generation uses different frequency bands and 5G is being designed to use very high frequencies. High-frequency radio waves enable high-speed transmission and small antennas. Being able to fit multiple small, cooperating antennas in a phone or other device (multiple inputs and outputs (MIMO) increases transmission range and speed. However, there is a high-frequency tradeoff -- low-frequency waves travel farther and are better able to penetrate obstacles like buildings and trees than high-frequency waves.

Small cell on the terrace
of a building in Bangalore

High-frequency networks will require a multi-tier architecture. With the current cellular network, phones and other devices communicate with a relatively distant base station that is connected by fiber or high-speed wireless to the Internet. Fifth-generation wireless will require many "small cell" radios that communicate with those high-capacity base stations.

Now back to Cuba (and other developing nations).

As of last year, there were 879 cellular base stations in Cuba, 358 of which had been upgraded to support 3G communication. As of 2016, 85.3% of the population was covered by 2G cellular and 47% of the population had 3G coverage. (Note that 2G coverage has barely increased since 2010 and it has been flat since 2012). If they continue rolling out 3G, it should reach the 85.3% fairly soon, but new base stations will have to be added to cover the entire population.

Upgrading from 2G to 3G requires new equipment and also more backhaul capacity between a base station and the Internet because 3G transmission speeds are greater than 2G and 3G applications use more data. For most Cubans, it would also require the purchase of a new phone. High-speed, 5G service would require much more backhaul capacity and new phones.

In densely populated areas it will be economically feasible to provide that backhaul using fiber, but fiber to support 5G capacity throughout the island would be very expensive. In many locations, satellite connectivity may turn out to be a better backhaul medium than fiber. SES Networks (O3b) will be offering connectivity using their middle-Earth orbit satellites before Cuba is ready for 5G and by the time they are ready, low-Earth orbit satellite connectivity from vendors like OneWeb and SpaceX Starlink will be available.

But what about the large number of small-cell radios that be feeding 5G base stations?

Like today's WiFi radios, they will be installed and maintained by community members and users. Cubans are known for do-it-yourslef innovation, for example in keeping old cars running and installing motors on bicycles and they have built community networks in places like Gaspar, Camagüey and Pinar del Río. Havana's SNET, is said to be the largest community network in the world that is not connected to the global Internet and there are over 8.000 amateur radio operators and over 1,400 active, self-employed programmers in Cuba.

Small cell radios will be semi-automatically configured and simpler to install and maintain than the WiFi radios used in today's street nets, but that is the easy part. Decentralized technology calls for decentralized decision making. Local people who are locally elected should decide questions like how many small cells to deploy in a neighborhood or rural area, where they should be located and how to pay for them. Would the current municipal electoral districts (from 200-3,000 inhabitants) be an appropriate locus of network control?

ETECSA would cede local control but be responsible for acquiring international bandwidth and providing backhaul over fiber or satellite from their base stations. They would also serve as consultants to local communities and could negotiate high-volume discount purchases of locally-owned equipment.

Note that I am still assuming a major role for ETECSA in spite of the fact that historically, nations like Cuba have privatized telecommunication and licensed foreign operators in exchange for investment in infrastructure. In previous posts I have suggested that vested interest and bureaucracy at ETECSA and uncertainty over control may be stifling Cuban Internet expansion. To the extent that that is the case, the new administration would have to change the organizational culture to focus on Cuba's stated economic and social policy goals -- leapfrogging current regulation and policy along with the technology. That may be wishful thinking, but if they are able to do so, they will have an advantage over nations in which private company profit trumps (no pun intended) social goals.

The technology is also ill-defined and unproven. While the standard for the first version of the 5G radio interface between a device and base station is complete, other hardware and software standards are still being developed and 5G is based on technologies that have been tested in trials, but not in large scale practice. The first deployments are not expected until next year, user and network equipment prices are not set and competing technologies like Starry may impact pricing and deployment.

Novel, unproven 5G wireless technologies (source)

In spite of this policy and technology uncertainty, ETECSA can start the ball rolling today by cooperating with and providing Internet gateways to SNET and other street nets, possibly in conjunction with support of the Internet Society and the Organization of American States. They can also learn from the experience of others like Gufinet in Spain and a variety of community networks in the US and elsewhere. At the same time, they should be following the 5G standards process directly and through their vendors, primarily Huawei and SES Networks (O3b), in order to plan for the future.

Cuban satellite connectivity -- today and (maybe?) tomorrow

Last January, Doug Madory of Dyn Research reported on Cuban traffic, noting that C&W's share had increased:

Yesterday Madory reported that ETECSA had activated a new internet transit provider, medium-Earth orbit (MEO) satellite-connectivity provider O3b Networks (Other 3 billion), replacing geostationary satellite provider Intelsat:

(They have also added Telecom Italia, which, until 2011, owned 11% of ETECSA, but I will save that for another post).

O3b's MEO satellites orbit at an altitude of around 8,012 km above the equator while Intelsat's geosynchronous satellites are at around 35,786 km, therefore the time for a data packet to travel from earth to an O3b satellite and back to Earth is significantly less than to an Intelsat satellite. This move to O3b may be related to ETECSA's recent decision to offer SMS messaging service to the US (at an exorbitant price) and it will surely improve the speed of interactive applications.

That is today's situation as I understand it, but now I want to speculate on the future of Cuban satellite connectivity -- say in the early 2020s.

First a little background on O3b Networks. O3b is a wholly owned subsidiary of SES but it was founded in 2007 by Greg Wyler, who has since moved on to a new venture called OneWeb. While O3b provides service to companies like ETECSA, OneWeb plans to also provide fast global connectivity to individuals in fixed locations like homes and schools as well as the "Internet of things."

This animation was prepared by Teledesic,
formed in 1990 to provide LEO satellite
connectivity. Teledesic failed, but
technology, the market and executive skill
have changed since that time.

OneWeb plans to connect the "other 3 billion" people using a constellation of around 1,600 satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) at an altitude of 1,200 km and another 1,300 in MEO at 8,500 km. They are working with many vendors and partners and plan to launch their first satellites in March 2018. They will begin offering service in Alaska in 2019 and hope to cover all of Alaska by the end of 2020. By 2025 they expect to have 1 billion subscribers and their mission is to eliminate the global digital divide by 2027.

Now, back to Cuba. ETECSA is doing business with Wyler's previous company O3b. Might they also be talking with his current company, OneWeb? It takes time to launch hundreds of satellites, so service is being phased in -- might Cuba come online sometime after Alaska? By connecting Cuba, OneWeb would gain publicity, the goodwill of many nations and access to a relatively well-educated, Internet-starved market and it would enable Cuba to quickly deploy broadband technology.

As I said, this is pure speculation. OneWeb faces significant technical, business and political challenges and may fail. Politics would be particularly challenging in the case of Cuba. Both the US and Cuba would have to make policy changes, but maybe the time is right for that -- the Cuban government will change in 2018 and the US government is likely to change in 2020 when Alaska comes online.

OneWeb has established an indirect relationship with ETECSA through O3b, but other companies, including SpaceX and Boeing, are working on similar LEO projects. Might ETECSA be talking to the others?

SpaceX is particularly interesting. Theirs is the most ambitious plan and their experience as a rocket company is invaluable. Less tangibly, founder, CEO and lead designer Elon Musk is known for audacious risk-taking. OneWeb will begin with Alaska -- might SpaceX begin with Cuba? In serving Cuba, they could also serve the Eastern US and since Cuba is an island the footprint of a satellite would not be so densely populated. SpaceX would gain publicity and international political good will.

To learn more, see this survey of LEO satellite plans and related issues.

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Update 2/27/2018

SES subsidiary O3b has gone public with their agreement to route ETECSA traffic and Doug Madory has updated the route graph (above) that he provided when he first noticed the link last December.

The following graph shows that O3b now accounts for about 5% of ETECSA's routes and, as in December, geosynchronous satellite provider Intelsat is gone. Latency over the O3b link will be much lower than it had been with Intelsat, so some users will see improved performance.

A friend tells me that the O3b ground station is about 25 miles east of Havana in Jarusco -- the location of the original Soviet Carib 1 ground station in 1974.

Satellite ground station in Jarusco (source)

Questions about Cuba's 3G mobile expansion

I hope ETECSA is planning for the future and views this 3G rollout as an interim stopgap.

ETECSA is rolling out 3G mobile service in Havana and elsewhere in Cuba and Telegeography reports that there are now 229 3G base stations in Cuba.

Where and how extensive is the coverage?

ETECSA says 3G coverage is available in all of Havana, provincial capitals and tourist resorts. AT&T says there is GSM/GPRS coverage for 85% of national territory.

Here is a crowdsourced 3G coverage map of Cuba as of February 17, 2017:

Strong signal: received signal strength indicator (RSSI) > -85dB, Weak: RSSI < -99dB

Again, this is a crowd-sourced map, so it represents a lower bound on coverage, but it paints an unsurprising picture of 3G deployment -- near a backbone and strongest in cities.

Who has access to the 3G network and what can they access?

Google Fi service was
available earlier this year.

Tourists and foreign business travelers have had expensive Internet access while roaming in Cuba for some time. For example, AT&T and T-Mobile charge $2 per megabyte. Recently Digicel recently announced much lower cost roaming on a "dedicated tourist-only 3G mobile network," which sounds like the network described by ETECSA above. They charge between 17 and 25 cents per megabyte, depending on the size of the prepaid order.

The best deal of all was fleetingly offered by Google on their Fi mobile service. Earlier this year, users reported that Google was treating roaming data the same as domestic data -- $10 per gigabyte. Unfortunately, that capability has been turned off, but it may be a hint of things to come.

But which Cubans -- other than Raúl Castro -- have 3G access? I have been told that some people have 3G access because of their work, but have no confirmation of that. I've also been told that some hackers have been able to get 3G access, but, again, have no confirmation.

Assuming that some Cubans have access to the 3G network, are they able to see the global Internet or are they restricted to services offered on the national network? (I bet Raúl has international access).

(source)

How about speed?

Armando Camacho ran a number of 3G speed tests in Havana (near the corner of Patrocinio and 10 de Octubre) and observed ping time to a server in Miami as ranging from 91 to 127 milliseconds, upload speed from .48 to 1.58 Mbps and download speed from .85 to 10.42 Mbps. He observed considerable speed variance, suggesting that others were sharing the same radio or backhaul resources.

What is the interim plan for 3G access?

Today the 3G network serves tourists, foreign business people, and perhaps some Cubans at work or in government. ETECSA may be planning to extend the service to subscribers as a much-needed supplement to their current public-access centers. I don't know what their plans are, but more 3G will require more fiber and microwave connectivity for backhaul. Only ETECSA knows what they are installing today.

They may also be planning to extend 3G mobile to rural areas. In April, the Ministry of Agriculture announced plans to bring Internet connectivity and other computer services to rural areas beginning in Granma, Ciego de Ávila and Isla de la Juventud. Will 3G be part of this promised rural coverage? Again, backhaul would have to be provided.

What is the long-run mobile plan?

Regardless of the short-run, 3G technology is only an interim step. Since Cuba has so little legacy infrastructure, they are in a position to leapfrog today's 4G technology and plan for 5G mobile connectivity. If that is the case, they should be investing in fiber for backhaul in places that microwave can serve today -- long, microwave "daisy chains" will not have the speed or capacity for a modern Internet in five or ten years. They should also be planning on fiber to the curb, building, and home in order to support the myriad devices expected to comprise the Internet of things as well as fixed connectivity.

Fifth generation standards are not yet set, but the migration of base-station function to the "cloud" will occur as the number of base stations and backhaul speed increase. That implies the need for datacenter planning and investment for the future. (See this Stragey& analysis for more on the 5G architecture).

As usual, I have more questions than answers, but I hope ETECSA is planning for the future and views this 3G rollout as an interim stopgap.

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6/12/2017

Tu Android, the Cuba Android community blog, has a post on determining whether your smartphone is compatible with Cuban 3G. The post begins with an overview of the requirements and lists compatible phones sold by ETECSA and the Blu phones that are compatible. Evidently, that was not enough, because there are currently 316 comments in which users are helping each other out.

The comments are reminiscent of the early PC hobby days in the US -- questions and answers are coming from uncertain users and expert hackers. As the Tu Android tagline reads -- "this is a family, not a blog." (I am naively hopeful that Cuban culture may produce a unique Internet from which we can all learn).

If you are a Cuban and not sure whether your phone can or can be altered to use the 3G network or are not sure why you cannot connect (evidently ETECSA is rolling out activations over time) check out the post and the comments -- ask the family.

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Update 6/22/2017

We now have a couple of answers to our 3G mobile questions. Hilda María Arias Pérez, Central Director of ETECSA’s Mobile Services Division, says there are 4,220,000 mobile accounts and 856 2G locations, covering 75% of Cuban territory and 85% of the population. They began the 3G rollout in April and now have 343 3G locations covering 13 % of the territory and 47% of the population. (For more on mobile coverage, see this post).

Engineer Arias Pérez discusses ETECSA's mobile coverage in this interview:

Wishful thinking -- Google Fiber in Havana

Might ETECSA, Cuba's government-monopoly telecommunication company, collaborate with Google to provide connectivity in Havana? This post offers conjecture, but it is informed conjecture.

Consider the following:

• When Google Fiber started in Kansas City, most people assumed that it was a demonstration project, intended to spur investment by the incumbent US Internet service providers (ISPs). Few thought that Google wanted to become a retail ISP.
• Google Fiber garnered a lot of publicity and Google, began speaking of it as a real, profit-making business. They announced other cities and started laying fiber in some of them.
• Last June, Google bought Webpass, a small ISP that deploys fiber and was experimenting with unproven, but perhaps revolutionary pCell wireless technology from Artemis Networks. I speculated that they might be thinking of shifting Google Fiber to a hybrid fiber-wireless model based on that acquisition and other experiments they were conducting.
• Last October Google Fiber announced that their work would continue in cities where they had launched or were under construction, but they would "pause operations and offices" in cities in which they had been conducting exploratory discussions and they took many, but not all workers off the Google Fiber project.
• Google's Project Link has installed wholesale fiber backbones in two African capitals and I have suggested and speculated that they might do the same in Havana (with the caveat that they do it in conjunction with ETECSA, since there are no competing retail ISPs in Cuba as there are in Africa).



Google fiber backbones in Kampala and Accra

• Last July ETECSA announced that they would be running a fiber trial in parts of Old Havana. They did not specify if it was fiber to the premises or neighborhood.
• A month ago, a friend told me that a friend of his who worked at ETECSA said the fiber trial would begin December 5.

• Last week, Trump threatened to "terminate the deal" (whatever that means to him) if Cuba would not make it better.
• Yesterday, nearly identical stories suggesting that the White House was pushing Cuba on deals with Google and General Electric were published in the Wall Street Journal and El Nuevo Herald.

That is all for real -- now for the conjecture ...

Maybe the trial in Old Havana will be a joint project between Google and ETECSA. Google has considerable fiber installation experience with Project Link in Africa and Google Fiber in the US. A joint project with ETECSA would be relatively simple because they would not have to deal with competing ISPs as in Africa or lawsuits and other obstacles from incumbent ISPs as in the United States.

It could either be a pilot experiment -- a trial -- or the first step in leapfrogging Havana's connectivity infrastructure. One can imagine Google installing a fiber backbone in Havana like they have done in Accra and Kampala and leaving it up to ETECSA to connect premises using a mix of fiber, coaxial cable and wireless technology.

If that were to happen, Havana could "leapfrog" from one of the worst connected capital cities in the world to a model of next-generation technology. If things went well in Havana, which city would be next?

The partnership between Google and ETECSA could take many forms. Google might supply expertise and capital and ETECSA could supply labor and deal with the Cuban and Havana bureaucracies.

In return, Google would get terrific publicity, a seat at the table when other Cuban infrastructure like data centers or video production facilities were discussed and more users to click on their ads. (Take that Facebook). Havana could also serve as a model and reference-sell for cooperation between Google and other cities. (Take that Comcast and AT&T). There might even be some revenue sharing, with ETECSA paying Google as the ISPs do in Africa.

This would also be a win for the US administration and President Obama's legacy. Trump says he wants to renegotiate "the deal" with Cuba. If so, he would find Google (and GE?) at the negotiating table along with US airlines, telephone companies, hotel chains, cruise lines, etc.

Again -- this is conjecture ... but would the Wall Street Journal print something if it were not more than a rumor -- perhaps something leaked by the White House?

A Google-ETECSA collaboration in Old Havana?

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Update 12/7/2016

Well, it looks like my conjecture was off base. December 5th has come and gone without an announcement of the fiber trial in Havana with or without Google's participation.

The US-Cuba Bilateral Commission met today and their press release enumerated considerable progress in several areas, but said nothing about deals with Google or other companies.

An article in OnCuba says that agreements were reached with Google, General Electric, Goodyear, Caterpillar and Norwegian, Royal Caribbean and Pearl Seas Cruises. It restates that Cubans have access to the Play Store and mentions their collaborated on Kcho's WiFi hotspot, but it says nothing about more connectivity or collaboration with ETECSA.

The possibility of a uniquely Cuban Internet

This post is not about what I think will happen, but to begin discussion of what the Cuban government could do if the goal were to provide a modern, open Internet with affordable (free in some cases?) access.

The Cuban Internet is in a sorry state. Freedom House ranks Cuban Internet freedom 62nd among the 65 nations they survey and the UN International Telecommunications Union ranks Cuban information and communication technology development last among 32 nations in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Historically, there are three primary causes for the sad state of the Cuban Internet -- the US trade embargo, Cuban poverty at the time of their connection to the Internet and the government's fear of information. (We'll discuss a possible new constraint, ETECSA, later).

President Obama has lifted the first barrier and, when we look at other poor Latin America and Caribbean nations, we see that Cuba could afford a better Internet than it currently has.

That leaves fear of an open Internet. The government says the Internet is a priority and they want to expand access as quickly as financially feasible. I am skeptical, but let’s assume they are sincere – what might they do in the short term and the long term?

In the short term

Cuba cannot afford ubiquitous, modern Internet infrastructure today – they need low-cost interim action while planning for the long term. Here are some low-cost ways they could improve the Internet in the short run:

• Run a pilot study using the same sort of satellite equipment that Alan Gross was arrested for bringing into the country and, If successful, follow with  a national roll out – with access points marketed and supported by Cuba’s recently-legal small business people.
• Equip central offices with equipment to upgrade dial-up to DSL accounts.
• Use terrestrial wireless links to establish points of presence in rural locations.
• Legitimatize and support local area streetnets.
• Legitimatize and support the weekly “packages” of movies, TV series episodes, magazines and software that are distributed by independent vendors on flash drives. (This would requires some kind of copyright agreement).
• Provide high-speed connectivity to universities and the medical network over the ALBA-1 undersea cable.
• Begin networking of Cuban schools and improve connectivity at the Youth Computer Clubs
• Legitimatize and support the development and export of Cuban software and software services.
• Encourage and support the establishment of a vital startup community.

What about the long term?

Long range planning, addressing technology and, more important, infrastructure ownership and regulation policy, should begin immediately.

Cuba has little Internet infrastructure. There is an undersea cable to Venezuela, but little fiber on the island. (Eventually, Cuba might take control of the cable being installed between Guantánamo and Florida). Nearly all home connections are dial-up and the cell network is obsolete 2G technology. There are 573 public access computers in 155 locations, but they are slow and an hour online costs nearly a week’s pay for many workers.

Cuba should leapfrog today’s technology, looking toward developments that are five or more years out – 5G  mobile communication, high frequency wireless by Google and others, the satellite constellation projects from SpaceX and OneWeb, connectivity using an undersea cable from Havana and perhaps the one at Guantánamo, etc. Routing traffic using version 6 of the Internet protocol will prepare them for the “Internet of things.”

The long range planning of technology is necessary, but formulating policies for ownership of infrastructure and regulation is more important -- not only for Cubans, but for the rest of the world as well if the Cuban experience leads to innovative policies.

The conventional wisdom is that Cuba should invite foreign companies to install infrastructure – a path many developing nations have followed with marginal success. It is not certain that Cuba, with its current government and weak economy, could attract foreign investment, but even if could, I would hate to see Cuba's Internet future in the hands of companies like AT&T or Orange.

If they do go with foreign investment, I would not be surprised to see them partnering with Google rather than a traditional ISP – Google executives have visited Cuba and Google is clearly interested in global connectivity. My experience in the US leads me to trust Google to do a better job than the incumbent ISPs, but, I would still have to ask -- in the long run, why should we expect Google to be better for the Cuban people than a traditional ISP? (I'd ask the same question of aspiring global satellite ISPs SpaceX and OneWeb).

Cuba should go slowly and consider a broad range of infrastructure ownership policies like municipal ownership in Stockholm, government as a venture capitalist in Singapore, government as rural wholesale backbone provider as in India, individual ownership of final links, etc. Cuban policy makers should consider a broad range of policy models -- Chile, Iceland, Vietnam, Estonia, etc. etc.

In 1997, fear of free speech led the government to squelch the Internet, but today there is another potential stumbling block – ETECSA, Cuba’s monopoly Internet service provider. ETECSA is usually described as a state-owned monopoly, but it’s privately owned by a murky collection of investors (rumored to include Fidel and Raúl Castro) and regulated by the Ministry of Communication.

The relationship between ETECSA and the Ministry is unclear – which organization makes investment decisions, sets prices, gets the profits or absorbs the losses, etc.?

Cynics predict the Cuban Internet will undergo a Soviet-style sell-off to foreign investors who will run it for their profit. But, if the Cuban government sincerely embraces its socialist goals, it has a chance to create a uniquely Cuban Internet with the goal of providing universal, affordable access to its citizens rather than making profit for private ISPs, ETECSA or the government. I’m skeptical, but hope I’m wrong.

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Update 3/18/2015

One of my long-term suggestions was that Cuba keep an eye on OneWeb, which hopes to provide global satellite connectivity. CEO Greg Wyler, speaking at the Satellite 2015 Conference yesterday, said they hope to be offering service by 2019 -- providing $250 ground stations that require no setup and establish a 50 mbps connection to the Internet and a WiFi, LTE, 3G and 2G local area network.

One of my short-term suggestions was that Cuba deploy geostationary satellite ground stations. They could do that today, but, if OneWeb is successful, their satellite links will be cheaper and superior to today's satellite offerings in every way.

Grag Wyler speaking:

A OneWeb ground station -- no setup required:

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Update 3/22/2015

It seems that Internet access at the University of Santiago de Cuba has been significantly improved. I am being a vague because the post I read has been translated into English and is hard to follow. It sounds like the university now has a fiber link and speed and data caps have improved significantly.

Can someone fill me in on the details of this upgrade and on the general state of connectivity at Cuban universities?

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Update 3/28/2015

Ricardo Alarcon, head of the Ministry of Higher Education announced a deal with ETECSA to substantially improve university Internet access. It sounds like every university will have both domestic and international links. The article is vague and inconsistent on technical details, but it also says students will have access to 40,000 digital magazines -- double the previous amount.

The article also refers to an upgrade to the university network, REDUNIV. The figure below was taken from a PowerPoint presentation last updated in 2005. I am saddened to see a frame relay backbone, but I am sure it has been upgraded since that time. Does anyone have information about the current network?

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Update 5/11/2015

I suggested that Cuba would be better off owning and controlling their telecommunication infrastructure rather than turning it over to foreign investors and they may be heading in that direction.

Lina Pedraza Rodríguez, Cuban Minister of Finance and Prices, said that Cuba is in "very advanced" negotiations with Huawei at the World Economic Forum on Latin America last week.

Pedraza also said the Cuban telecoms sector would be open to all foreign companies but also noted that the country wanted to avoid the "negative parts of the Internet."

Pedreza also feels that things are moving slowly with the US and called for the elimination of our trade embargo.

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Update 5/28/2015

One of my short-run suggestions was to legitimatize and support shared WiFi hotspots. Raymond J. Delgado Sutil has written a post that elaborates on that suggestion. He estimates that ETECSA's revenue from Internet access "navigation rooms" is around 907,000 CUC per year and the cost of installing WiFi access points at each navigation room and Youth Computer Club location would be about $200,000. Users would use their own computers and phones, eliminating the need for more computers in the navigation rooms. He says ETECSA should "just do it" rather than conducting a "study."

Unfortunately, Delgado does not mention backhaul speed at the navigation rooms or whether they connect to the undersea cable for international traffic. The backhaul speed is only 2 mb/s at the ballyhooed free hotspot of the artist Kcho. At that speed, performance would be very poor whether access was over WiFi or using one of the original hard-wired computers. Similarly, if international access were routed over satellite, response would be very slow.

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Update 7/16/2015

Raul Castro has reported that Cuba's economy is growing at a 4.7 percent annual rate (due to increased tourism?) and Cuba is "strictly meeting its debt obligations with foreign creditors and suppliers." A stronger economy will enable Cuba to pursue a relatively independent Internet strategy, without excessive reliance on foreign investment.

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Update 7/18/2015

Speaking at the 10th Congress of the Young Communist League of Cuba, Deputy Minister of Communications Jose Luis Perdomo said they were working on connectivity from homes, lower costs, access from educational, health, scientific, cultural and sport centers as well as industrial, business and service centers.

More concretely, he said they planned provide Internet service to 3G cellular users and deploy WiFi in Havana and provincial capitals. There is little 3G cellular today -- does that mean they plan to extend it? He also said they were deploying IPv6.

Deputy Minister of Communications Jose Luis Perdomo

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Update 11/19/2015

We suggested that Cuba shift to IPv6 and, as the following figure shows, they are routing IPv6 traffic over Tata and Newcomm (satellite) networks, but not Telefonica. I believe the "other" traffic is internal to Cuba -- peering with CENIAI Internet (AS10569).

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Update 1/17/2016

In considering future technology, infrastructure ownership and policy options, Cuba should look at the experience of others. Steve Song has just posted his annual Africa Telecoms Infrastructure review. The review might provide some insights for Cuban policy makers and they should be consulting with folks like Steve Song.

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Update 9/29/2016

Hybrid fiber-wireless is another future technology Cuba should track. Google, cell phone companies and others are experimenting with a number of options for "last kilometer" technology. One in particular, PCell wireless, might turn out to be appropriate in Cuba if it proves to be practical.

Demonstrations of PCells in labs are impressive, allowing full speed wireless connections to computers or mobile devices that are inches apart. One would expect closely situated radios operating in the same frequency band to interfere with each other, but PCells capitalize upon interference, analyzing it to create very small zones of clear reception.

It remains to be seen how this technology works on the street as opposed to the lab and Webpass, a boutique high speed Internet service provider that was recently acquired by Google, and Nokia are both evaluating PCell technology. If it turns out to be effective, PCell might be particularly appropriate in Cuba with its penchant for do-it yourself improvisation.

PCell access points are small and distributed compared to conventional cell towers and, if they turn out to be effective, they could be installed by the people -- like a "street net." They remind me of the home-made dishes people used to pirate TV signals broadcast from the Havana Libre hotel back in the day and the installation of local area network wiring in California schools by students and staff during "Net Days."

PCell access points

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Update 10/5/2016

In this post, I have suggested several short-run, interim steps Cuba could take while evaluating and planning for leapfrogging to next-generation infrastructure when they are financially and politically ready to create a modern Internet. I wrote the post about a year and a half ago, and started by saying that it was what I hoped would happen, not what I expected to happen.

There have been some short-run improvements during the last 18 months, but not all that I had hoped for. I have no idea what, if any, plans have been made for leapfrogging to next-generation infrastructure -- the planning process is not open or transparent.

One thing is for sure -- there will be no leapfrogging on infrastructure without leapfrogging to next-generation policy on infrastructure ownership and regulation. Next generation policy should be geared toward meeting economic and social goals, not to maintaining telecommunication bureaucracy and revenue or on politics. As we see below, the world is trending in that direction.

Global trend toward 4th generation regulation, based on social and economic goals

And, fourth generation regulation is correlated with broadband connectivity:

Un método Cubano para lograr conectividad a internet

(Versión Inglés)

La infraestructura doméstica de conexión a internet en Cuba es una de las peores del mundo, y sus posibilidades de mejoría son ínfimas a causa del embargo de E.U, las políticas de control de acceso y de limitaciones al acceso, el poder de ETECSA, la falta de una base de técnicos y usuarios entrenados y en alta demanda, y la falta de capital. ¿Podría eliminarse de alguna manera estos obstáculos?

El embargo va a ser derogado eventualmente, y hay signos de que podría ser relativamente pronto. Mientras tanto, China y otros países están dispuestos a vender y negociar con Cuba.

Las políticas de control gubernamentales podrían cambiar. Cuando Cuba se unió a internet por primera vez, hubo un debate de alto nivel sobre “el dilema del dictador” - la percepción de internet como una amenaza política y cultural contra su potencial de mejorar la vida de las personas y la economía. Se tomó entonces la decisión de controlar internet y el acceso al mismo - pero esta situación no está tallada en piedra, podría revertirse.

¿Y sobre ETECSA? ¿Existe acaso alguna nación en la que el proveedor de telecomunicaciones (sea propiedad del gobierno o privado) no actúe en interés propio a detrimento de la población y la economía? Sospecho que la respuesta es “no”. No conozco a la administración actual de ETECSA, pero me sorprendería que fuera diferente al resto.

ETECSA pertenece conjuntamente al Ministerio de Informática y Comunicaciones y a la empresa RAFIN, SA. El Ministerio lógicamente es parte del gobierno y se somete a su voluntad política -pero las políticas y los líderes pueden cambiar-.

RAFIN es un asunto diferente. No sé cuál es su rol en la administración de ETECSA. Ni siquiera comprendo el rol de una S.A en una nación socialista. ¿Dónde obtuvieron el capital para comprar la parte de ETECSA que pertenecía a Telecom Italia? ¿Quiénes son los accionistas e inversores? ¿Comparten ellos las ganancias y pérdidas de ETECSA? ¿Obtienen un puesto en el consejo de administración -una voz en las decisiones ejecutivas y de políticas a aplicar-? Necesito ayuda de un economista en esta parte.

Una base de técnicos y usuarios entrenados llegará una vez que la conectividad sea útil, globalmente disponible, y abordable -llegara como consecuencia, no como requerimiento, para una internet moderna-.

Nos queda entonces la falta de capital. China jugó un papel activo en el financiamiento e instalación del cable submarino ALBA-1, y en ese entonces especulé que a lo mejor harian una inversión en la infraestructura doméstica, pero esto hasta el momento no ha sucedido.

La sabiduría convencional del Banco Mundial o de la Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones es que el camino para lograr el capital necesario para la conectividad es privatizar la industria de las telecomunicaciones y de los proveedores de servicios de internet (ISP), e invitar entonces a inversores extranjeros a construir la infraestructura y competir hasta cierto nivel mientras son controlados por una agencia reguladora – Privatización, Regulación y Competencia (PCR).

Raúl Castro anunció que el gobierno está trabajando en una nueva política de inversión extranjera, lo cual es de singular importancia para estimular el desarrollo económico y social del país. La ley se espera que esté aprobada en Marzo próximo. Falta ver si la nueva ley y la supuesta demanda atraerá o no a inversionistas mayores, pero incluso si sucediera, hay un problema con la estrategia PCR – no funciona bien.

Muchas naciones en desarrollo optaron por la estrategia PCR entre 1991 y 2008:

En el año 2009, observé los datos y concluí que "PCR tuvo un impacto pequeño sobre Internet durante los últimos diez años en naciones desarrolladas o en desarrollo." No he actualizado el artículo con datos consecutivos, pero nuestra experiencia en E.U muestra que la propiedad privada sobre los servicios de telecomunicaciones no garantiza la competencia, la eficiencia y el buen servicio, a pesar de las buenas intenciones de los reguladores y del congreso.

Necesitamos una solución Cubana.

Seria genial si Cuba pudiera permitirse comprar una infraestructura moderna de telecomunicaciones, con fibra óptica hasta las edificaciones y retroalimentación (backhaul) para comunicaciones móviles LTE (siglas en inglés para “evolución a largo plazo”), pero no puede, por lo que tenemos que pensar en soluciones a corto plazo más baratas. El resto de este artículo lo dedicaremos a especular sobre una posibilidad, una política descentralizada multi-satelital.

Varios años atrás, escribí dos artículos (aquí y aquí) abordando las tecnologías inalámbricas para la conectividad en países en desarrollo: plataformas enlazadas y no enlazadas de altitud elevada (HAPs), redes inalámbricas terrestres (WiMAX era esperanzadora en aquel entonces), constelaciones de satélites de órbita baja (LEO) y terminales de satélite de apertura muy pequeña (VSATs).

Google experimenta actualmente con HAPs, pero sin ninguna utilización significativa. Hasta donde conozco, nadie está estudiando los satélites LEO y WiMAX no se desarrolló como se había previsto. En la época en que se escribieron esos artículos, VSAT era la única opción para conectar áreas rurales en naciones como la India, pero las estaciones terrestres VSAT eran grandes, caras y lentas.

Desde aquel entonces, la tecnología ha progresado, y el mercado de consumidores para la conexión por satélite ha crecido. Proveedores estadounidenses como HughesNet y Viasat tienen 1 398 000 suscriptores entre los dos. A pesar de los largos tiempos de respuesta, he tenido video-conferencias fluidas con amigos que usan platos satelitales en zonas rurales de Brasil y Chile. Las antenas son pequeñas, los costos bajan, y la velocidad crece.

¿Qué pasaría si el gobierno cubano fomentara el uso de los satélites en lugar de prohibirlos?

El gobierno de Cuba ha dicho que autorizará agentes para la venta de tiempo de teléfono e internet. ¿Que pasaria si expandieran el programa para permitir a esos agentes a poseer y vender tiempo y servicios usando enlaces de internet por satélite –- de la misma forma que las “damas de teléfonos Grameen” en Bangladesh compraban teléfonos celulares para revender el tiempo de llamada?

Hoy, hay algunos puntos de satélite instalados ilegalmente en Cuba. Imaginemos 1000 platos de satélite legales, dispersos por toda la isla, suministrando acceso a internet y a llamadas VOIP (las cuales son ilegales hoy).

Si esta idea se tomara en consideración, imagino que ETECSA querría poseer las estaciones terrestres y establecer los precios. Eso garantizaría las ganancias y el control gubernamental sobre el acceso a Internet, pero sería una estrategia de corta visión. Permitir a los operadores de satélites ser propietarios de su equipamiento, crearía un grupo descentralizado, auto-controlado, de empresarios que aportarían esfuerzo e innovaciones al proyecto.

La situación en Cuba hoy es un recuerdo de lo que era Internet al final de los años 1980 en E.U. Se inventó TCP/IP y mostraba ser efectivo en las redes APRANet y CSNET. El potencial de la red era obvio para aquellos que la habían utilizado, pero el acceso estaba restringido a unas pocas organizaciones y personas.

En aras de conectar a más personas, la Fundación Nacional de Ciencia (National Science Fundation) estableció NSFNet. Ellos contrataron una infraestructura de conexión nacional (blackbone network), y ofrecieron fondos a todos los colegas y universidades para cubrir los costos de un enrutador (router) y de la conexión a la infraestructura nacional. También ofrecieron conexión a redes de educación e investigación en países en desarrollo. Cuando fue desactivado en Abril de 1995, NSFNet era la infraestructura de conexión global, enlazando 28 470 redes domésticas y 22 296 foráneas. (Nótese que Spring, el proveedor de conectividad para naciones en desarrollo, también suministraba conectividad a Cuba, a pesar del embargo)

El proyecto NSFNet en su totalidad costó al contribuyente de E.U $94.5 millones – una inversión pequeña con un retorno inestimable. Cubrir a Cuba con una sábana da platos satelitales tendría resultados similares.

La inversión de NSFNet fue altamente balanceada. Mientras que las universidades obtenían conexión gratuita a la red nacional, se esperaba que ofrecieran acceso para las facultades y los estudiantes. Colectivamente, las universidades invirtieron mucho más en las redes locales de sus campus, en entrenamiento y en personal, que lo que invirtió NSF en NSFNet. El enfoque descentralizado y la arquitectura "end-end" de la red empujaron tanto la formación de capitales como innovaciones a el borde de la red donde hubieron inversionistas y empresarios listo para participar.

¿Cuál sería el rol del gobierno Cubano en un mundo de acceso satelital descentralizado? Su tarea más importante sería la planificación de la capacidad y la negociación con las compañías suministradoras de comunicación por satélite para el ancho de banda. Ellos tendrían además que especificar, evaluar y comprar equipamiento para estaciones terrestres (algunas de los cuales podrían fabricarse en la isla).

Ellos deberían también tomar la delantera en el desarrollo de software que opere eficientemente cuando no hay conexión, usando compresión automática de datos y trasfiriendo los mismos cuando el usuario se conecte. Este tipo de software sería útil en cualquier país con ancho de banda limitado, no solo en Cuba. Dado que la necesidad es la madre de la invención, podríamos incluso llegar a ver soluciones novedosas para ejecutivos ocupados viajando en “modo avión”.

El gobierno debería también apoyar a los operadores de satélite ofreciéndoles préstamos bancarios que ayuden con el costo inicial del equipamiento, facilitando entrenamiento y compartiendo experiencia y “mejores prácticas”. Uno puede imaginarse un banco de micro-finanzas controlado por el gobierno que ofrezca préstamos, y el gobierno pagando los costos de operación de una asociación de operadores de satélite. Como sucedió con NSFNet, el gobierno podría irse alejando de estas actividades una vez que la red sea estable y auto-sostenida.

Por supuesto el sistema de satélites es solo un paso intermedio, a largo plazo será desplazado en favor de una infraestructura de fibra óptica moderna. El sistema de satélites pavimentaría el camino hacia ese objetivo, al crear demanda y habilidades en los usuarios. Los enlaces de satélite servirían de guía al gobierno sobre como asignar sus escasos recursos de fibra óptica -regiones de alta demanda se conectarían primero que las demás-. (Google siguió una estrategia similar al priorizar barrios cuando instalaron su red Giga-bit en la ciudad de Kansas, - áreas con muchos suscriptores fueron las primeras en conectarse-).

Nótese que he sugerido que el gobierno sea responsable por la infraestructura de fibra óptica, pero no por proveer el servicio de internet. Deberían ver la infraestructura de conexión como si fueran carreteras – proveer una infraestructura para ser usada por tractores, autobuses y autos que tienen propietarios independientes. China siguió una estrategia de lanzamiento de internet similar, con organizaciones del gobierno construyendo las infraestructuras de red que para finales de 1999 estaban siendo usadas por más de 500 proveedores de servicio de internet.

Recordemos que las universidades de NSFNet aportaron sus propias redes locales. Uno puede entonces imaginarse redes locales a nivel de ciudad o de pueblos, enlazando estaciones terrestres en la ciudad. Como en el caso de NSF, el diseño y la inversión en tales redes deberían ser locales. En este caso, viene a mi recuerdo las redes de distribución de TV “hechas en casa”, en las que la gente usa su propio cable coaxial para conectar casas y otros locales a una estación central terrestre.

Al inicio de esta publicación, expuse una lista de barreras en el camino a la conectividad en Cuba. He presentado una propuesta de arrancada de bajo costo para una conectividad que no requiere inversión extranjera.

Esto deja entonces las barreras políticas. Tal vez hay esperanza. Como se menciona antes, E.U ha manifestado un deseo de cambio de política y Raúl Castro a llamado a los cubanos a adoptar las reformas económicas “sin prisa, pero sin pausa.”

Un estímulo más específico viene del primer Vice-Presidente Miguel Díaz-Canel, quien dijo: "Hoy, con el desarrollo de las tecnologías de la información, de las redes sociales, de la informática y la Internet, prohibir algo es casi una quimera imposible. No tiene sentido. (...) Por tanto, nosotros constantemente tenemos que estar dialogando."

Reconozco la ironía de proponer que el gobierno adopte una tecnología que llevó al encarcelamiento de Alan Gross y otros. Revertir la legislación sobre comunicación satelital requeriría coraje político, pero también brindaría al gobierno un argumento poderoso contra las acusaciones que pesan sobre él y estarían persiguiendo una solución cubana , una en la que Internet es operado como un servicio al pueblo y la sociedad, no al gobierno o a compañías de telecomunicaciones.

Traducción de un amigo de la Internet cubana.
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Actualización
1/10/2014

Una persona que respondió a mi post menciono que no es necesario que la política de los EE UU cambia para este propuesta tenga éxito. Afirma que en Abril 2009 el gobierno Americano aprobó la venta de satélites para servicios Internet.

Revise lo que la administración en "Reaching out to the Cuban People" especificaba y aprendí que autorizaba cable de fibra óptica y satélites de comunicación que conectaban Cuba con EE UU -- explícitamente para radio y televisión, pero no mencionaba la Internet.

Le pregunté al Departamento del Tesoro, si un proveedor de Internet por satélite podría obtener una licencia para servir a una cuenta de Cuba. Me contestaron que tendrían que revisar para darme una respuesta.
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Actualización
1/18/2014

Satélite ISP IPSTAR dice que han conectado más de 26.000 escuelas en Tailandia, lo que permite a más de 2.000.000 estudiantes el acceso a los materiales de aprendizaje en línea y aplicaciones basadas en IP. Se conectan a las LAN en las escuelas y el aprendizaje "cafés" y se centran en la entrega de matrial enseñanza. Este programa parece ser relativamente centralizado y muy específicas, sino que es un ejemplo de un proyecto de conectividad por satélite patrocinado por el gobierno.

Aquí está un breve vídeo IPSTAR en la educación y otras aplicaciones:

A Cuban approach to achieving Internet connectivity

(Spanish version)

Cuba's domestic Internet infrastructure is one of the worst in the world and the prospects for improvement are dim because of the U. S. embargo, a Cuban government policy of access control and scarcity, ETECSA's power, the lack of a trained, demanding technician and user base and a lack of capital. Can these obstacles be overcom?

The embargo will eventually be dropped, and there are signs that that may be relatively soon. In the interim, China and others are willing to sell to and trade with Cuba.

Governmental control policy can change. When Cuba first joined the Interent, there was high level debate over the dictator's dilemma -- the perceived political and cultural threat of the Internet versus its value in improving people's lives and the economy. The decision was made to control the Internet and access to it, but that is not set in stone -- it can be reversed.

How about ETECSA? Is there any nation in which the incumbent telecommunication provider -- whether government owned or privately held -- has not acted in its self interest to the detriment of the people and economy? I suspect the answer to that question is "no." I have no knowledge of the current management of ETECSA, but I would be surprised if they were different than others.

ETECSA is jointly owned by the Ministry of Information and Communication and RAFIN, SA. The Ministry is of course part of the government and subject to political will -- policies and leaders can change.

RAFIN is a different matter. I don't know what their role is in the management of ETECSA. I don't even understand what the role of an "SA" is in a socialist nation. Where did they get the capital to purchase Telecom Italia's share of ETECSA? Who are the shareholders and investors? Do they share ETECSA profits and losses? Do they have a "seat on the board" -- a voice in picking executives and making policy decisions? I need the help of an economist here.

A trained, demanding technician and user base will come after connectivity becomes useful, widely available and affordable -- it will follow, not lead the path to a modern Internet.

That leaves the lack of capital. The Chinese took an active role in the financing and installation of the ALBA-1 undersea cable, and we speculated that they might also invest in complementary domestic infrastructure, but that has not happened.

The conventional wisdom from the World Bank or International Telecommunication Union is that the way to raise capital for connectivity is to privatize the telecommunication/ISP industry, and invite foreign investors to build infrastructure and compete on a level playing field watched over by a regulating agency -- privatization, regulation and competition (PCR).

Raúl Castro announced that they are working on a new foreign investment policy, which is of "singular importance to stimulate economic and social development of the country." The law is expected to be approved next March. It remains to be seen whether the new law and perceived demand would attract major investors, but even if they would, there is a problem with the PCR strategy -- it does not work well.

Many developing nations opted for PCR between 1991 and 2008:

In 2009 I looked at the data and concluded that "PCR has had little impact on the Internet during the last ten years in developed or developing nations." I have not updated that paper with subsequent data, but our experience in the US shows that private ownership of telecommunication service providers does not guarantee competition, efficiency and good service in spite of the good intentions of the regulators and congress.

We need a Cuban solution.

It would be great if Cuba could afford modern telecommunication infrastructure, with fiber to premises and backhaul for LTE mobile communications, but it cannot, so we need to think about cheaper interim approaches. The remainder of this post will speculate on one possibility -- a decentralized, multi-satellite policy.

Several years ago, I wrote a couple of articles (here and here) surveying wireless technologies for connectivity in developing nations -- tethered and untethered high-altitude platforms (HAPs), terrestrial wireless (WiMAX was a hope at the time), low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations and very small aperture satellite terminals (VSATs).

Google is experimenting with HAPs, but there are no meaningful deployments. As far as I know, no one is studying LEO satellites and WiMAX has not developed as envisioned. At the time of those earlier articles, VSAT was the only option for connecting rural areas in nations like India, but VSAT ground stations were large, expensive and slow.

Since that time, technology has progressed and the consumer market for satellite connectivity has grown. U. S. providers HughesNet and Viasat have 1,398,000 subscribers between them. In spite of long latency times, I have had smooth video conversations with friends using home satellite dishes in rural Brazil and Chile. The antennae are small, costs are down and speeds are up.

What if Cuba were to encourage the use of these dishes rather than ban them?

Cuba has said they will authorize agents to sell telephone and Internet time. What if they were to expand the program to allow those agents to own and sell time and services using satellite Internet links, in the same way Grameen Phone ladies in Bangladesh bought mobile phones to resell call time.

Today, there are a few illegal satellite installations in Cuba. Imagine 1,000 legal satellite dishes dispersed throughout the island providing Internet access and VOIP calls (which are illegal today).

If that were to be considered, I imagine ETECSA would want to own the ground stations and set prices. That would insure profits and government control over Internet access, but it would be short sighted. Allowing the satellite operators to own their own equipment, would create a decentralized, self-organizing group of entrepreneurs who would bring effort and innovation to the project.

The situation in Cuba today is reminiscent of the Internet in the late 1980s in the U. S. TCP/IP had been invented and shown to be effective in the APRANet and CSNET. The potential of the network was obvious to those who had used it, but access was restricted to a few organizations and people.

In order to bring others online, The National Science Foundation established NSFNet. They contracted for a national backbone network and offered all U. S. colleges and universities grants to cover the cost of a router and a connection to the backbone. They also offered connectivity to education and research networks in developing nations. When it was decommissioned in April 1995, NSFNet was the global backbone, linking 28,470 domestic and 22,296 foreign networks. (Note that Sprint, the developing nations connectivity provider, also provided connectivity to Cuba in spite of the embargo).

The entire NSFNET project cost the U. S. taxpayer $94.5 million -- a small investment with an inestimable return. Blanketing Cuba with small satellite dishes would have similar results.

The NSFnet investment was highly leveraged. While universities got free connections to the backbone, they were expected to provide access for faculty and students. Collectively, universities invested much more in their campus local area networks, training and staff than NSF did in NSFnet. The decentralized approach and the end-end network architecture pushed both capital formation and innovation to the edge of the network where there were eager investors and entrepreneurs.

What would be the role of the Cuban government in a decentralized satellite access world? Their most important task would be capacity planning and negotiating with satellite communication companies for bandwidth. They would also specify, evaluate and purchase ground station equipment (some of which could be manufactured on the island).

They should also take the lead in developing software for efficient offline operation with automatic compression and data transfer when the user goes online. That software would be useful in any limited bandwidth nation, not only Cuba. Necessity being the mother of invention, we might even see some novel solutions for busy executives travelling in "airplane mode."

The government should also support the satellite operators by offering loans to help with initial equipment costs and by facilitating training and the sharing of experience and best practices. One can imagine a government run micro-finance bank offering loans and the government paying the overhead costs for a satellite operator's association. As was the case with NSFNet, the government could phase out of some of this activity once the network was stable and self-sustaining.

Of course the satellite system is an interim step -- in the long run, it will be phased out in favor of modern fiber infrastructure. The satellite system would pave the way to that goal by building user skill and demand. The satellite links would also guide the government in allocating scarce fiber resources -- high demand areas would be connected before others. (Google followed a similar strategy in prioritizing neighborhoods when rolling out their gigabit network in Kansas City -- areas with many committed subscribers were the first to be connected).

Note that I have suggested the government be responsible for a fiber backbone, but not for providing Internet service. They should view the backbone as they view highways -- providing infrastructure for use by independently owned trucks, buses and cars. China followed a similar Internet rollout strategy, with government organizations building backbone networks that, by the end 1999, were being used by over 500 Internet service providers.

Recall that the NSFNet universities provided their own local area networks. One can also imagine pueblo or ciudad-area networks linking the ground stations in a town. As with NSF, the design and investment in any such networks should be local. In this case, I am reminded of the home-made TV distribution networks, in which people would install their own coaxial cable to connect homes and other locations to a central ground station.

At the start of this post, I listed hurdles along the road to Cuban connectivity. I have outlined a low-cost, bootstrap proposal for connectivity that does not require foreign investment.

That leaves the political hurdles. Maybe there is hope. As noted above, the U. S. has signaled a desire for political change and Raúl Castro has admonished Cubans to embrace economic reforms "without haste, but without pause."

More specific encouragement comes from First Vice-President Miguel Díaz-Canel, who has stated that "Today, with the development of information technologies, of social networks, of computing and the Internet, prohibiting something is almost a chimera, impossible ... makes no sense ... We must constantly be in dialogue."

I recognize the irony in proposing that the government embrace a technology that led to the imprisonment of Alan Gross and others. Reversing the law on satellite communication would require political courage, but it would also provide the government a powerful argument against the charges leveled against them and they would be pursuing a Cuban solution -- one in which the Internet is operated as a service to the people and society, not the government or telecommunication companies.
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Update 1/5/2014

A person commenting on this post argued that U. S. policy would not have to be changed for this proposal to succeed -- he suggested that the policy changes announced by the administration in April 2009 cleared the way for sales of satellite Internet service.

The administration fact sheet on Reaching out to the Cuban People authorizes fiber-optic cable and satellite telecommunications facilities linking the United States and Cuba. It goes on to explicitly allow satellite radio and television service, but does not mention Internet service.

I sent an inquiry to the Treasury Department asking if a satellite Internet provider would be able to get a license to serve a Cuban account. A spokesman replied that he would find out and let me know.
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Update 1/17/2014

Satellite ISP IPSTAR says they have connected over 26,000 schools in Thailand, allowing more than 2,000,000 students access to online learning materials and IP-based applications. They downlink to LANs in schools and learning "cafes" and focus on delivering teaching matrial. This program appears to be relatively centralized and narrowly focused, but it is an example of a government sponsored satellite connectivity project.

Here is a short IPSTAR video on education and other applications:


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Update 2/10/2014

As noted above, there are political obstacles to this proposal in both Cuba and the U. S. I asked the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U. S. Treasury Department, which oversees our Cuba trade policy, about this proposal.

OFAC's Cuban Assets Control Regulations policy regarding the Internet is as follows:

§515.578 Exportation of certain services incident to Internet-based communications.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the exportation from the United States or by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to persons in Cuba of services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging, is authorized, provided that such services are publicly available at no cost to the user.

(b) This section does not authorize:

(1) The direct or indirect exportation of services with knowledge or reason to know that such services are intended for a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba, as defined in §515.337 of this part, or a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party, as defined in §515.338 of this part.

(2) The direct or indirect exportation of Internet connectivity services or telecommunications transmission facilities (such as satellite links or dedicated lines).

Note to §515.578(b)(2): For general licenses related to the provision of telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba and contracts for telecommunications services provided to particular individuals in Cuba, see §515.542(b) and §515.542(c), respectively, of this part. For a general license and a statement of specific licensing policy related to the establishment of telecommunications facilities linking the United States or third countries and Cuba, see §515.542(d) of this part.

(3) The direct or indirect exportation of web-hosting services that are for purposes other than personal communications (e.g., web-hosting services for commercial endeavors) or of domain name registration services.

(4) The direct or indirect exportation of any items to Cuba.

Note to §515.578(b)(4): For the rules related to transactions ordinarily incident to the exportation or reexportation of items, including software, to Cuba, see §§515.533 and 515.559 of this part.

(c) Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for the exportation of other services incident to the sharing of information over the Internet.

The policy disallows satellite Internet connectivity services, which I have proposed here, but it does allow for specific licences on a case by case basis. When I asked about that, a spokesperson stated "Off the record, I just don't think our licensing policy has extended that far."

I checked with a second expert, anonymous source who disagreed, stating that a license probably would be granted and that an explicit change in policy was in fact under consideration.

He also pointed out that the biggest sticking point might be the issue of garnishment/attachment -- U. S. companies are afraid that by entering into business with Cuba/ETECSA, they would open themselves to lawsuits in the U. S. by Cuban-Americans trying to recuperate damages for expropriations by the Cuban government. This roadblock might require Congressional legislation to “protect” U. S. companies from such suits.

The bottom line from the U. S. side seems to be that there are obstacles, but there seems to be a desire to overcome them -- that would leave the ball in the Cuban government's court.

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Update 6/30/2014

Google has several non-terrestrial communication projects that could be deployed in Cuba and Eric Schmidt travelled there, leading us to wonder whether Google might not be intersted in providing Cuban connectivity.

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Update 8/22/2014

MIT Media Lab founder Nichlas Negropont gave a TED talk summrizing his work over the last 30 years. He concludes with his plan for the future -- using stationary satellites to connect the "last billion" -- the poorest, rural people -- to the Internet. (That part of his talk begins at 17:05). He mentions that he has a partner in this project -- might it be Google?


Here is what he had to say:

And so my plan, and unfortunately I haven't been able to get my partners at this point to let me announce them, but is to do this with a stationary satellite. There are many reasons that stationary satellites aren't the best things, but there are a lot of reasons why they are, and for two billion dollars, you can connect a lot more than 100 million people, but the reason I picked two, and I will leave this as my last slide, is two billion dollars is what we were spending in Afghanistan every week. So surely if we can connect Africa and the last billion people for numbers like that, we should be doing it.